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China Enters the War

THE NKPA ARE DEFEATED

    •  Sep 1950: US amphibious force left Pusan, landed – “strategically brilliant” but risky. USSR had warned Kim re danger, but he focussed on Pusan.

    •  10 Sep: USAF used napalm to clear path.

    •  15 Sep: US troops landed, took Seoul airfield; by 22 Sep, 6,600 vehicles, 25k tons fuel & 54k troops flown in.

    •  28 Sep: Seoul liberated; US pushed inland.

    •  Simultaneously, US 8th Army broke out from Pusan → NKPA trapped. USSR & China urged Kim to retreat – too late → Gen. Walker: “Pursue & ”.

    •  NKPA officer Pak Ki-song later claimed retreat was a trap – most historians disagree: NKPA disintegrated.

    •  NKPA losses: 135k POWs, 200k casualties, all tanks & heavy weapons, whole supply trains. Survivors regrouped near Pyongyang = only 30k.

         

WHY did the UN defeat the NKPA?

    1.  UN = 385k troops, 5× tanks, better artillery, full air/sea control (270 ships); USAF flattened Inchon.

    2.  Inchon only defended by 2k poorly-trained troops. Kim had ignored USSR advice to mine harbour.

    3.  Bruce Cumings: Inchon success = due to Admiral Arthur organising landing.

    4.  Kim had focused all 98k troops at Pusan → Inchon flanked NKPA.

    5.  NKPA expected 50-day op; by Sep = exhausted, hungry (USAF cut supplies).

         

THE UN INVADES NORTH KOREA

    •  By end-Sep, Rhee restored as South Korean President; UN troops reached 38th Parallel.

    •  1 Oct: MacArthur demanded NKPA surrender.

    •  7 Oct: UN Resolution 376 = authorised “” → 9 Oct: MacArthur invaded North Korea.

    •  Truman wanted to stop at 38th Parallel (feared China entering), but others saw chance to roll back communism.

    •  15 Oct: Truman met MacArthur ( Island). MacArthur claimed China wouldn’t intervene. Truman reassured.

    •  19 Oct: US 8th Army took Pyongyang.

    •  24 Oct: ROK 6th Div reached Yalu (China border); US & Australian forces close behind.

         

WHY did the UN invade North Korea?

    1.  To destroy NKPA military capacity in North Korea

    2.  NKPA appeared defeated; no resistance.

    3.  US policy shift: NSC68 (Apr 1950; containment) → (Sep: rollback). Truman happy for MacArthur to invade if China stayed out.

    4.  MacArthur (v. influential) insisted China wouldn’t intervene.

    5.  Many Americans wanted revenge for deaths & atrocities – status quo was not enough.

    6.  UN agreed: aim = reunify Korea → Resolution 376.

    7.  Syngman pushed hard for full unification; ROK forces led advance.

         

THE CHINESE CAMPAIGNS

    •  MacArthur promised victory by Xmas.

    •  Planned ‘’ invasion: ROK + X Corps (east), 8th Army (west), mountains between = no comms.

    •  Progress = easy; media reported success. Recon saw no sign of Chinese forces.

    •  In reality, PVA had begun crossing Yalu on 13 Oct.

    •  Mao had decided to act by Aug; 1 Sep warned he’d not accept North Korean invasion.

         

WHY did the Chinese intervene?

    1.  PRC = fanatical communists, fresh from 20 years of civil war, wanted to extend rev.

    2.  Also proud nationalists, wanted revenge for past imperialist humiliations.

    3.  Called forces ‘People’s ’ to avoid direct war w. US.

    4.  North Korea begged China for help after 15 Sep.

    5.  Mao: felt a moral duty to help Korean allies “who have stood on our side”.

    6.  Mao feared US/Rhee-led Korea on China’s border.

    7.  Helping North Korea would ↑ China’s in communist bloc.

         

    •  By 19 Oct: 200k Chinese troops hidden in mountains.

    •  25 Oct: launched – hit UN west advance hard, then vanished.

    •  UN regrouped, resumed push north in late Nov.

    •  By then, PVA = 380k.

    •  25 Nov: Second Phase Offensive – drove UN back in -22°C temps.

    •  Followed by 3rd, 4th, 5th offensives.

    •  Seoul fell 4 Jan 1951; by end Jan, PVA controlled ⅔ of Korea.

    •  US = shocked. MacArthur considered nuking North Korean supply routes.

         

WHY were the Chinese able to drive back the UN troops?

    1.  MacArthur = overconfident; ignored frontline warnings.

    2.  UN forces = over-stretched, stuck on narrow roads; no link between east & west prongs.

    3.  Chinese tricked UN into over-advancing, then ambushed.

    4.  UN recon missed build-up: PVA moved at night, hid by day. Troops deliberately misinformed → gave inconsistent info when captured → US intelligence wrongly concluded no Chinese Army present.

    5.  PVA = veteran guerrillas, tough, disciplined, led by trained officers.

    6.  No heavy kit – light infantry using surprise night attacks, bugles, terrifying ‘’ charges.

    7.  I close combat used classic trap: let US advance into ‘V’, then close behind → panic & retreat.

    8.  Weather helped PVA – US gear froze, Chinese used to harsh winters.