2. UN forces = over-stretched, stuck on narrow roads; no link between east & west prongs.
3. Chinese tricked UN into over-advancing, then ambushed.
4. UN recon missed build-up: PVA moved at night, hid by day. Troops deliberately misinformed → gave inconsistent info when captured → US intelligence wrongly concluded no Chinese Army present.
5. PVA = veteran guerrillas, tough, disciplined, led by trained officers.
6. No heavy kit – light infantry using surprise night attacks, bugles, terrifying ‘’ charges.
7. I close combat used classic trap: let US advance into ‘V’, then close behind → panic & retreat.
8. Weather helped PVA – US gear froze, Chinese used to harsh winters.
THE NKPA ARE DEFEATED
• Sep 1950: US amphibious force left Pusan, landed INCHON – “strategically brilliant” but risky. USSR had warned Kim re danger, but he focussed on Pusan.
• 10 Sep: USAF used napalm to clear path.
• 15 Sep: US troops landed, took Seoul airfield; by 22 Sep, 6,600 vehicles, 25k tons fuel & 54k troops flown in.
• 28 Sep: Seoul liberated; US pushed inland.
• Simultaneously, US 8th Army broke out from Pusan → NKPA trapped. USSR & China urged Kim to retreat – too late → Gen. Walker: “Pursue & DESTROY”.
• NKPA officer Pak Ki-song later claimed retreat was a trap – most historians disagree: NKPA disintegrated.
• NKPA losses: 135k POWs, 200k casualties, all tanks & heavy weapons, whole supply trains. Survivors regrouped near Pyongyang = only 30k.
WHY did the UN defeat the NKPA?
1. UN = 385k troops, 5× tanks, better artillery, full air/sea control (270 ships); USAF flattened Inchon.
2. Inchon only defended by 2k poorly-trained troops. Kim had ignored USSR advice to mine harbour.
3. Bruce Cumings: Inchon success = due to Admiral Arthur STRUBLE organising landing.
4. Kim had focused all 98k troops at Pusan → Inchon flanked NKPA.
2. UN forces = over-stretched, stuck on narrow roads; no link between east & west prongs.
3. Chinese tricked UN into over-advancing, then ambushed.
4. UN recon missed build-up: PVA moved at night, hid by day. Troops deliberately misinformed → gave inconsistent info when captured → US intelligence wrongly concluded no Chinese Army present.
5. PVA = veteran guerrillas, tough, disciplined, led by trained officers.
6. No heavy kit – light infantry using surprise night attacks, bugles, terrifying ‘HUMAN WAVE’ charges.
7. I close combat used classic trap: let US advance into ‘V’, then close behind → panic & retreat.
8. Weather helped PVA – US gear froze, Chinese used to harsh winters.